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Executive Summary
1. In integrated capital markets, assets are priced according to a com-
mon set of risks. By contrast, prices reflect country-specific factors in
segmented markets.
2. Capital market integration offers the possibility of better capital al-
location and greater economic growth, improved country risk-sharing,
enhanced portfolio diversification, and a lower cost of capital. However,
it also exposes a country to capital flight and imported credit crunches,
inefficient capital allocation if information problems are significant, in-
creased corruption incentives, and a failure to work well when most
needed.
3. Recent microeconomic studies suggest that diversification and cost of
capital improvements from integration may largely be exhausted in
developed countries and hence are likely to be primarily confined to
emerging countries. But longer-term macroeconomic evidence seems
to indicate that the gains from capital market liberalisation have prin-
cipally been enjoyed by developed countries.
4. Financial economists have developed a number of methods for identi-
fying and measuring the degree of integration, both globally and for
individual countries. These include: return correlations, tests of for-
mal asset pricing models constructed under the assumption of perfect
integration, cross-country equivalence of implied pricing factors, con-
vergence of valuation ratios, and various foreign market participation
metrics.
5. The overall picture painted by the limited number of existing appli-
cations of these methods to New Zealand suggest (i) a high degree
of integration with Australia, (ii) greater integration with Asia-Pacific
countries than those of Europe or North America, and (iii) no com-
pelling evidence of a general segmentation problem.
6. However, these conclusions must be treated with considerable caution,
given that most of the analysis on which they are based is often sourced
from relatively old data or from studies that are either preliminary
and/or are not focussed on New Zealand. Thus, it remains possible that
New Zealand could achieve, and benefit from, additional capital market
integration. Further work – applying the most recently-available New
Zealand data to the methods noted above – is required to determine
whether or not this is the case.
7. Existing studies suggest that the achievement of additional integration
is largely driven by factors that are either beyond New Zealand’s control
or on which it already scores highly. However, paying much closer
attention to investor property rights may well be helpful in this regard.
1 Integration of national capital markets:
definition, consequences and evidence
1.1 Definition
What exactly is meant by the term ‘capital market integration’? And how
does this differ from ‘market segmentation’? Emiris (2002) neatly sum-
marises the distinction as follows:
“If markets are completely integrated, assets possessing the same
risk characteristics will have the same price even if they are traded
on different markets. In completely integrated capital markets,
investors face common and country-specific or idiosyncratic risk,
but price (identically in all markets) only common risk factors,
because country-specific risk is fully diversifiable. When markets
are partially integrated, investors face both common and idiosyn-
cratic risks and price them both. If markets are completely seg-
mented, investors face and price only country-specific sources of
risk. In this case, the same projects in two countries can have dif-
ferent expected returns, since the sources of risk and their prices
may differ across markets.”
In other words, any two markets that are perfectly integrated effectively
operate as one entity, with investors in those markets facing – and pricing –
a common set of risks. By contrast, two markets that are perfectly segmented
operate as separate entities with investors facing – and pricing – risks unique
to each market. Partially integrated markets fall somewhere between these
two extremes, exactly where depending on the extent to which integration
has occurred.
In segmented markets, the capital investment of firms in one country is
limited to the savings provided by that country’s consumers, whereas inte-
gration allows firms to access savings from other countries. This de-linking
of investment from domestic savings occurs, for example, when:
• investors in one country are able to purchase capital market securities
in another country;
• firms in one country are able to raise capital (by selling new securities)
in another country;
1
• firms in one country list their securities (new or existing) in the capital
market of another country.
1.2 Consequences
Why does the topic of capital market integration so exercise the minds of
economists and policy-makers? The reason is straightforward: integration
holds out the promise of significant opportunities, but also exposes a country
to additional risks.
Greater integration of capital markets offers four principal, and inter-
related, benefits:
• Better allocation of capital
Countries in which there is a shortage of investment capital (and hence
offer a high rate of return) are able to access surplus capital from coun-
tries where investment returns are low. As a result, capital is allocated
to more productive uses, the overall return on investment rises, and
economic growth is enhanced.1
• More efficient risk sharing
Access to foreign capital markets allows countries to de-link consump-
tion from output, thus enabling an intertemporal smoothing of con-
sumption and hence an improvement in national welfare. For example,
the effects of a temporary recession can be softened by borrowing from
abroad in order to sustain aggregate consumption (with the debt then
repaid during a future output upswing).2
• Enhanced portfolio diversification
One of the most enduring principles in all of finance is diversification:
adding more imperfectly-correlated securities to a portfolio allows in-
vestors to reduce portfolio risk without any sacrifice of expected return.
Accessing foreign capital markets not only results in a wider range of
securities with which to implement this strategy, but also, at least po-
tentially, offers securities whose returns are only weakly correlated with
1For a more formal illustration of this point, see Levi (1990, pp7-9).
2This, of course, assumes that output fluctuations are imperfectly correlated across
countries, i.e., not all countries are in recession at the same time. For a more detailed
discussion of the risk sharing mechanism, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
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those available in the domestic market – thereby maximising possible
diversification benefits.
• Lower cost of capital
Capital market integration can lead to a lower cost of capital via two
avenues. First, the cost of equity capital is proportional to domestic
market volatility in a segmented market, but depends only on the co-
variance with ‘world’ returns in an integrated market. Given that such
covariances are typically much lower than local variances, this directly
lowers securities’ expected returns and hence the cost of capital.3 Sec-
ond, firms can broaden their shareholder base and enhance liquidity –
both of which lower required returns and the cost of capital (see Mer-
ton, 1987) – by listing on a foreign exchange. A lower cost of capital
should stimulate investment and enhance economic growth.
In addition, capital market integration exposes financial intermediaries
to foreign competition, sharpens the disciplines imposed on policy makers,
and encourages development of domestic capital markets. But moving from
segmentation to partial integration, or from partial to full integration, also
carries with it the risk of some less desirable outcomes:
• Capital flight
While greater integration allows, and encourages, more foreign capi-
tal to flow into domestic capital markets, it also allows it to flow out
again, with potentially adverse consequences for the domestic economy.
For example, wholesale withdrawal of foreign capital in response to a
domestic shock that, perhaps only temporarily, reduces the country’s
attractiveness as an investment destination puts significant pressure
on its currency and interest rates, thus exacerbating the effects of the
shock.
• Credit crunch
In a similar vein, domestic firms that come to rely on rolling over financ-
ing from foreign lenders may encounter difficulties when international
credit conditions tighten. Any inability to renew financing, or to do so
3That is, country-specific risk factors are diversifiable – and so do not require compen-
sation – in an integrated market. In effect, foreign investors bid up the prices – and thus
lower the expected return – of local securities in order to obtain the diversification benefits
discussed above.
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at reasonable cost, has obviously adverse consequences for aggregate
domestic consumption.
• Systemic information problems
The usual information problems associated with financial markets are
inevitably greater for cross-country transactions, so – as predicted by
the theory of the second best – capital may inadvertently flow into
areas where the expected return fails to cover its opportunity cost.4
• Corruption
Greater integration may, paradoxically, facilitate increased corruption
activity. Because improved detection methods and legal systems have
made it more difficult for corrupt officials to conceal the proceeds of
their graft domestically, smuggling abroad has become more necessary,
a process that is assisted by integration. Indeed, corruption and per-
capita GNP appear to be negatively correlated in countries with more
integrated capital markets, but not in segmented countries.5
• Collapsing correlations The observed tendency of asset correlations to
all head towards 1.0 in the presence of a crisis suggests that the benefits
of international diversification may disappear exactly when they are
most needed. Historically, such has been the fate of many investors,
as exemplified by the 1929 address of the Alliance Trust Company
chairman:6
“Trust companies...have reckoned that by a wide spreading
of their investment risk, a stable revenue position could be
maintained, as it was not to be expected that all the world
would go wrong at the same time. But the unexpected has
happened, and every part of the civilized world is in trou-
ble...”
Such a lament would no doubt echo loudly with many investors today.
4See Stiglitz (2000).
5See Neeman et al. (2008).
6Quoted in Bullock (1959).
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1.3 Evidence
Given the above debate surrounding the consequences of capital market in-
tegration, it is instructive to briefly consider the empirical evidence on this
issue.
• Portfolio diversification
Early studies by Grubel (1968), Levy and Sarnat (1970), and Solnik
(1974) all illustrate the practical benefits available to US investors from
international diversification. For example, Solnik finds that an interna-
tionally diversified portfolio has only 11.7% of the variance of a typical
security, compared to a figure of almost 27% for a portfolio containing
only United States stocks. More recent studies have suggested that
such gains also exist in other markets and other countries: Hunter and
Simon (2004) uncover significant benefits from international bond di-
versification, even during periods of weakness or high volatility in these
markets; Meyer and Rose (2003) find that diversifying internationally
helped protect New Zealand investors from the effects of the Asian
crisis.
However, the most exhaustive study of international diversification –
Goetzmann et al. (2005) – suggests a more cautious conclusion may
be warranted. First, as their Figure 3 (reproduced here as Figure 1)
shows, the low return correlations underpinning the observed benefits
of international diversification are largely an artifact of the post-WWII
period. Second, the average cross-country correlation has risen signifi-
cantly since 1990. Third, correlations have been at their highest during
periods of greatest integration. As they tellingly note (p21):
“(Integration) allows investors to diversify across borders,
but it also reduces the attractiveness of doing so.”
In short, there is a clear ‘paradox of integration’.
Goetzmann et al. (2005) also show that recent diversification benefits
have largely been driven by an expansion of the investment opportu-
nity set due to to the appearance of capital markets in emerging coun-
tries. By contrast, the increasing correlations between developed mar-
kets have severely reduced the benefits of diversification across those
5
Figure 1: Average international 5-year return correlations. Source: Goetzmann
et al. (2005, Figure 2).
countries.7 Consistent with this view, Costello et al. (2008) conclude
that investing in Australian markets no longer provides any significant
diversification benefits to foreign investors.
• Cost of capital
Researchers have used a variety of methods to estimate the impact of
greater market integration on the cost of capital. Henry (2000) exam-
ines the local stock market response to the relaxation of controls on
foreign participation in 12 countries and finds a strong upward revalu-
ation – implying a fall in the cost of capital. In a similar analysis of 20
emerging countries, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) use an explicit proxy
for the cost of capital and estimate that this falls by between 5 and 75
basis points following stock market liberalisation.
Miller (1999) investigates the impact of international dual listings and
reports a positive – and permanent – revaluation in the stock prices of
7Another long-term study of capital market returns - albeit with fewer countries than
Goetzmann et al. (2005) - by Dimson et al. (2002) arrives at a similar conclusion.
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Table 1: Studies Examining the Benefits of International Diversification — Ex-
amples and Summary of Findings
Significant Benefits Insignificant Benefits Uncertain/Conditional
Grubel (1968) Costello et al. (2008) Goetzmann et al. (2005)
Levy and Sarnat (1970) Dimson et al. (2002)
Solnik (1974) Lewis (2006)
Hunter and Simon (2004)
Meyer and Rose (2003)
Ang and Bekaert (2002)
de Santis and Gerard (1997)
firms undertaking such listings. Errunza and Miller (2000) take this ap-
proach a step further by explicitly calculating the cost of equity capital
for non-American firms and estimate that this falls by approximately
42% following a listing in the United States.
Other authors shed indirect light on the link between integration and
the cost of capital. For example, Lins et al. (2005) find that the sen-
sitivity of investment to cash flow decreases significantly for emerging
market firms that list on a United States exchange, suggesting that
such firms experience a weakening of financial constraints and hence,
presumably, a fall in their cost of capital.
Although this evidence all tends to point towards a beneficial impact
of integration on the cost of capital, some caution is warranted. First,
as Bekaert and Harvey (2000) note, the existence of such gains depends
crucially on the new opportunities providing diversification benefits to
international investors. Since correlations between developed markets
have risen sharply in recent years – see the Goetzmann et al. (2005)
evidence discussed above – it seems likely that the potential cost of
capital improvements resulting from further integration between such
countries is likely to be small. Some support for this view is provided
by the Lins et al. (2005) study of United States listings by foreign firms
– they report no change in the investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms
from developed countries. This suggests that at least this avenue to a
lower cost of capital is essentially closed to developed countries.
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Table 2: Recent Studies Examining the Cost of Capital Response to Increased
Market Integration — Examples and Summary of Findings
Positive Response Zero/Negative Response Uncertain/Conditional
Henry (2000) NA Bekaert and Harvey (2000)
Miller (1999) Lins et al. (2005)
Errunza and Miller (2000) Lewis (2006)
Smith and Sofianos (1997)
Tandon (1997)
• Economic growth
Somewhat surprisingly, given the uniformly positive impact of financial
market liberalisation on the cost of capital, macroeconomic studies of
the relationship between liberalisation and economic growth have pro-
duced very mixed results. Although Quinn (1997) reports a positive
relationship in 64 countries between 1960 and 1989, Rodrick (1998)
finds exactly the opposite correlation in 100 countries between 1975
and 1989. Edwards (2001) deepens the puzzle by showing that the cor-
relation is positive in high-income countries, but negative in low-income
countries. Why this should be the case when diversification benefits -
and hence cost of capital improvements – have elsewhere been shown to
be greatest in emerging countries has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.
Adopting a more micro-focused approach, Bekaert et al. (2007) argue
that de jure (and possibly de facto) capital market integration is more
important for realising growth opportunities than is financial develop-
ment, external finance dependence, and investor protection measures.
Table 3: Recent Studies Examining the Effect of Capital Market Liberalisation
on Economic Growth — Examples and Summary of Findings
Positive Response Zero/Negative Response Uncertain/Conditional
Quinn (1997) Rodrick (1998) Edwards (2001)
Kose et al. (2008) Prasad et al. (2007)
• Risk sharing
Similar ambiguity exists with regard to the impact of capital market
integration on risk sharing. On one side, several studies conclude that
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the relationship has been modest at best. For example, Sorenson and
Yosha (1998) and Melitz and Zumer (1999) examine the extent of risk
sharing in pre-monetary union Europe and find that only 40% of po-
tential risk sharing was achieved on average, and that most of this
occurred through credit, rather than capital, markets. Similarly, Kose
et al. (2007) conclude that the average level of international risk shar-
ing in 69 countries over the 1960–2004 period was well below the level
predicted by theory, and that the reduction in consumption volatility
that had occurred was largely confined to developed countries. How-
ever, Artis and Hoffman (2008) argue that this disappointing outcome
is largely a statistical illusion induced by the failure of these studies to
account for an across-the-board drop in output volatility.
Table 4: Recent Studies Examining the Effect of Capital Market Liberalisation
on Country Risk Sharing — Examples and Summary of Findings
Positive Response Zero/Negative Response Uncertain/Conditional
Artis and Hoffman (2008) Kose et al. (2007) Kose et al. (2003)
Kim and Sheen (2007) Sorenson and Yosha (1998)
Melitz and Zumer (1999)
Moreover, risk sharing is not an end in itself, only a means to the
ultimate end of improving aggregate welfare. Thus, the observance
of relatively low levels of cross-country risk sharing need not imply
that there are unexploited (in the sense of being welfare-enhancing)
opportunities. In this context, a particularly relevant paper by Kim and
Sheen (2007) examines the history of risk sharing between Australia
and New Zealand. Similar to the European evidence noted above, they
find that approximately 60% of risk-sharing opportunities between the
two countries during the 1960–2002 period was unexploited. However,
they also note that this figure dropped sharply following the mid-1980’s
deregulation in both countries — from 72% during 1960–1983 to 55%
during 1984–2002. Most importantly, they estimate the welfare gains –
as measured by certainty-equivalent consumption – of full risk sharing
in the latter period to be negligible, suggesting the two countries have
little to gain from additional risk sharing.
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• Conclusion
Although the above summary of the literature in this area is by no
means exhaustive, it nevertheless illustrates the ambiguity that exists
about the effects of capital market integration. On the one hand, re-
flecting the paradox of integration, recent microeconomic studies sug-
gest that diversification and cost of capital gains from integration may
largely be exhausted in developed countries and hence are likely to be
primarily confined to emerging countries. On the other hand, longer-
term macroeconomic evidence seems to indicate that the gains from
capital market liberalisation have principally been enjoyed by devel-
oped countries. One obvious explanation for this is that developed
countries have better institutions and policies that allow them to cap-
ture the benefits of integration in ways that emerging countries cannot,
but Kraay (1998) and Arteta et al. (2003) find evidence suggesting that
the impact of capital market openness on growth is largely unaffected
by various development and institutional measures. Another possibil-
ity, unexplored in the literature, is that there are lags in exploiting the
microeconomic gains from integration. Thus, developed countries, hav-
ing liberalised, and hence integrated, earlier, have reaped the benefits
that are still to accrue to emerging countries. If so, and if the cur-
rent crisis results in moves back towards segmentation, then emerging
countries may end up having been doubly stung: having incurred the
costs of capital market liberalisation, they may now find the benefits
whisked away from them just as they might otherwise have been about
to bear fruit.
2 Integration of national capital markets:
measurement and New Zealand evidence
The evidence summarised in section 1 suggests that the gains from capital
market integration have largely been captured by developed countries and
that any further gains are likely to accrue primarily to emerging countries.
Since New Zealand is a developed country, this implies that concerns about
a lack of integration with world markets may be redundant and that any
attempts to move towards further integration are unlikely to yield significant
10
benefits. However, many studies of the effects of capital market integration
do not employ New Zealand data, and in those that do the New Zealand
experience is largely swamped by that of much larger countries. Moreover,
New Zealand’s small size and relatively low-activity capital markets are also
features of many emerging markets. Consequently, it remains possible that
New Zealand’s capital markets are less integrated with the rest of the world
than might be expected on the basis of the literature on developed markets,
and hence could benefit from additional integration. Clearly, what is required
is a more detailed assessment of the current level of New Zealand integration
— just how integrated are New Zealand capital markets with those of other
countries?
Answering this question requires a means of identifying and measur-
ing integration. In this section, I outline the various methods devised by
economists for doing so, and describe and interpret relevant New Zealand
evidence.
2.1 De jure and de facto barriers to integration
In estimating the degree of financial integration, macroeconomists have fo-
cussed on (i) the absence of formal restrictions to international financial
investment (de jure integration) and (ii) the level of international capital
flows (de facto integration). Measure (i) has typically been based on the
IMF’s assessment on ‘restrictions on payments for capital transactions’ (line
E2 in the annual Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions table),
or some extension thereof, resulting in a zero/one dummy variable that clas-
sifies a country as open or closed. On this basis, New Zealand is obviously
categorised as open, although episodes such as that recently involving Auck-
land Airport suggest this assessment should perhaps be qualified.8 In any
event, such a measure is crude at best: the presence of direct barriers to
international investment may not indicate segmentation if these barriers can
be easily circumvented, as is often the case. Moreover, their absence need
not indicate integration if other indirect barriers – such as asymmetric in-
formation, differences in tax policies and financial reporting standards, and
cultural biases – are significant.
8Quinn (1998) attempts to categorise the intensity of controls. However, this makes no
difference to New Zealand’s ranking.
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Table 5: Foreign Capital Stocks: 1990 and 2000
(Foreign Assets + Foreign Liabilities)/GDP
Country 1990 2000
Australia 1.00 1.73
Canada 1.18 1.71
Finland 0.95 4.00
France 1.22 3.68
Germany 1.22 2.76
Iceland 0.72 1.50
Japan 1.11 1.00
New Zealand 1.27 2.00
South Africa 0.50 1.53
Switzerland 4.01 9.09
United Kingdom 3.52 6.22
United States 0.81 1.66
Source: Obstfeld and Taylor (2004)
Turning to (ii), this has often been assessed by looking at the evolution
of capital flows (relative to GDP) over time. For example, based on data in
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), Table 5 provides measures of ‘aggregate’ foreign
capital stocks (i.e., foreign assets plus liabilities as a proportion of GDP) for
selected countries. Two features stand out in this table. First, the inter-
national financial centres of Switzerland and the UK – presumably highly
integrated – experience high levels of international capital flows relative to
GDP, suggesting that this ratio can indeed serve as a rough proxy for capital
market integration. New Zealand sits approximately in the middle of the
group of countries in Table 5 with ratios of similar magnitudes to Australia.
Second, with the notable exception of Japan, all countries saw a significant
rise in this ratio between 1990 and 2000. By this yardstick, New Zealand has
lagged somewhat behind – an increase of only 57% versus a rise of over 300%
for Finland. Although not shown in the table, Obstfeld and Taylor note that
the 1990s increase in capital flows/GDP ratios occurred primarily in devel-
oped countries, suggesting the growth was primarily about ‘diversification
finance’ rather than ‘development finance’.
2.2 Equity market correlations
Actual capital flows, and hence stocks of assets and liabilities will also reflect
a number of factors unrelated to financial market integration, such as trade
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openness and monetary and fiscal policies. As a result, financial economists
have adopted more micro-based measures of integration that focus directly
on activities in capital markets. Of these, the simplest are equity market
return correlations.9 Formally, if Ri and Rj are returns in countries i and j
respectively, then the correlation coefficient for these returns is given by
ρij =
cov(Ri, Rj)
σiσj
.
where cov(Ri, Rj) is the covariance of Ri and Rj, and σi and σj are the cor-
responding return standard deviations. Note that ρij is a number between
−1.0 (perfect negative correlation) and 1.0 (perfect positive correlation). The
idea underlying correlation calculations is that because the price of a secu-
rity is the same in all markets under perfect integration, price changes (i.e.,
returns) will be perfectly correlated across individual markets. By contrast,
cross-country returns will be largely independent in perfectly segmented mar-
kets. In short, higher correlations indicate greater integration.
To shed some light on international – including New Zealand – return
correlations, two sources of data are employed. One – taken from Goetzmann
et al. (2005) – calculates correlations using up to 200 years of returns, i.e.,
a very long-term series. The other focuses on the more recent 1990-2007
period using data made available by the World Federation of Exchanges
(WFE).10 In the first case, the estimated statistic is the correlation of local
stock index returns with an equal-weighted world portfolio. In the second
case, individual pair-wise correlations are estimated for all countries in the
table with the average of these then calculated and reported. Both measures
therefore estimate the extent to which local stock returns co-vary with a
global index.
These correlation estimates appear in Table 6. Most correlations hover
around the 0.5 mark, although Ireland’s and Korea’s are notably lower.11 The
9In principle, similar calculations could be undertaken for bond markets. However,
secondary bond markets in most countries are highly illiquid, thus largely precluding
the use of data over any reasonable frequency, and hence restricting analysis to markets
such as Eurobonds that operate largely ‘outside’ national borders. Moreover, even where
reliable data are available, the close relationship between interest rates and monetary
policy means that it is difficult to infer much about financial market integration from
bond return correlations. Similar concerns also apply to the other methods of measuring
‘integration’ discussed in this section.
10See http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics.
11The lower long-term estimates for Germany and Japan is likely to reflect the disloca-
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Table 6: Equity return correlations with equal-weighted portfolios
In the WFE column, the reported equity return correlation for each country
is calculated as the average of the country’s individual correlations with
the other countries appearing in the table. The Goetzmann et al. (2005)
column reports the country’s equity return correlation with that of an equal-
weighted world portfolio. Numbers in parentheses denote the number of
years for which data are available in the Goetzmann et al. (2005) sample.
WFE Goetzmann et al. (2005)
Country 1990− 2007 1800− 2000
Australia 0.54 0.51 (126)
Canada 0.58 0.55 (87)
Finland 0.46 0.36 (79)
France 0.56 0.47 (145)
Germany 0.57 0.36 (55)
Indonesia 0.52 0.51 (13)
Ireland 0.37 0.38 (67)
Japan 0.45 0.34 (55)
Korea 0.29 0.30 (25)
Malaysia 0.51 0.61 (13)
New Zealand 0.50 0.53 (70)
Phillippines 0.52 0.39 (46)
Singapore 0.62 0.60 (31)
Taiwan 0.50 0.44 (16)
Thailand 0.38 0.52 (25)
United Kingdom 0.55 0.62 (201)
United States 0.31 0.49 (201)
correlation of New Zealand equity returns with the global index is estimated
to be 0.53 over the last 70 years and 0.50 over the last 17, comparable to
Australia’s estimates of 0.51 and 0.54 respectively, and consistent with a
fairly strong degree of integration within global equity markets.
Further insight into the New Zealand-Australia comparison is provided
by Table 7 which reports the WFE return correlations of these two countries
with each of the other 15 countries appearing in Table 6. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, both Australia and New Zealand returns are most highly correlated
with those of the Phillippines (0.78 and 0.82 respectively), with their own
correlation of 0.77 being only the second-highest for both. The other singu-
lar feature of Table 7 is that, essentially without exception, Australian re-
turns are more strongly correlated with those of western and more developed
countries (Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, United King-
tions induced by World War II.
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Table 7: New Zealand and Australia return correlations with individual coun-
tries
Correlations of New Zealand and Australia stock market returns with a se-
lection of individual countries. Based on WFE data between 1990 and 2007.
New Zealand Australia
Australia 0.77 1.00
Canada 0.51 0.63
Finland 0.18 0.29
France 0.36 0.58
Germany 0.39 0.63
Indonesia 0.61 0.50
Ireland 0.48 0.63
Japan 0.31 0.34
Korea 0.14 0.15
Malaysia 0.74 0.63
New Zealand 1.00 0.77
Phillippines 0.82 0.78
Singapore 0.65 0.66
Taiwan 0.63 0.54
Thailand 0.58 0.33
United Kingdom 0.51 0.65
United States 0.31 0.51
dom, United States) while New Zealand returns co-vary more with those of
emerging Asia-Pacific countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillippines, Taiwan,
Thailand). This may suggest that Australia and New Zealand differ in the
manner in which their capital markets are globally integrated – Australia be-
ing more integrated with European and North American markets, and New
Zealand more integrated with Asian and Pacific markets.
Simple returns correlations are, however, not entirely satisfactory as
measures of equity market integration. In the first place, interpretation of
intermediate correlation values is by no means straightforward – although
correlations of 1.0 and 0.0 can confidently be associated with integration
and segmentation respectively, it is unclear whether a value of 0.5 indicates
high or low integration. Presumably it suggests some positive level of in-
tegration, but how much exactly? Moreover, they estimate only a linear
relationship between returns in different countries, thus potentially overlook-
ing more complex relationships. In addition, they assume that the corre-
lation is constant through time, when it is almost certainly time-varying.
Finally, inter-market correlation coefficients can really only say something
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about short-run linkages, while remaining silent on longer-run relationships.
These issues – particularly the last – have led researchers to investigate more
‘sophisticated’ correlation measures, primarily based on the concept of coin-
tegration developed by Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988). The
idea here is that cointegration between two markets implies an absence of
long-run arbitrage opportunities across these markets.
Several studies have examined the cointegration relationship between
New Zealand and Australia. Narayan and Smith (2005) use monthly data
from 1967 to 2003 and conclude that the New Zealand market is not coin-
tegrated with either Australia or any of the G7 countries. However, several
other papers dispute this finding. Chen et al. (2008) apply slightly different
methods to more recent data (1990–2005) and find that the New Zealand
market is cointegrated with Australia, although the latter is more strongly
linked with the United States. Fraser et al. (2008) allow for time-varying
correlations and show that New Zealand equity returns have become increas-
ingly linked to those of Australia since the mid-1980s. Finally, Lok and Kalev
(2006) examine a sample of Australia-New Zealand cross-listed firms between
2000 and 2002 and report not only that the two countries’ cross-listed stocks
are cointegrated – indicating a long-run equilibrium relationship – but also
that any cross-market differences in the prices of individual stocks is tran-
sient, i.e., arbitrage opportunities are quickly dissipated, indicating a high
level of integration.
But there is only so much to be gleaned from return correlations –
whether simple or ‘sophisticated’ – for at least two reasons. First, a high
correlation may simply indicate a common exposure to cashflow shocks rather
than the existence of a common pricing factor. Second, a low correlation may
reflect international differences in industry weights rather than the lack of a
common pricing factor. In short, high equity return correlations are neither
necessary nor sufficient for integration, and low equity return correlations are
neither necessary nor sufficient for segmentation.
2.3 Asset pricing models
For the above reasons, researchers have investigated ways of extending the
correlation approach that avoid at least some of these problems. A particu-
larly common way of inferring capital market integration has been to search
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for various systematic factors associated with common movements in country
returns. In practice, this has involved testing the empirical implications of
specific international asset pricing models to see whether global or industry or
country (or regional) factors are most important for explaining cross-sectional
variation in returns. That is, are cross-country asset returns primarily driven
by a common (i.e., global) factor or factors, which would imply integration,
or by industry-specific but country-common factors, which would also imply
integration, or by country-specific factors, which would imply segmentation.
Broadly speaking, such tests have produced ambiguous results. For example,
Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and Bekaert et al. (2008) find that country
factors are important, but Brooks and Del Negro (2004) argue that much of
the apparent country effect is actually a regional effect, within which capital
markets are highly integrated.
The only study that appears to undertake this kind of analysis on New
Zealand data is Chay and Eleswarapu (2001), who examine the importance of
global versus country factors in explaining New Zealand stock returns before
and after the mid-1980s deregulation. They find that prior to deregulation,
New Zealand returns were exclusively determined by local factors, but that
global factors were subsequently more important (although not exclusively
so). However, their period of analysis ends in 1998.
Although potentially providing a rich vein of information, one problem
with studies of this kind is that they tend either to be highly specific to a
particular asset pricing model or are forced to engage in a ‘fishing expedi-
tion’ for relevant factors. Partly as a response, Ammer and Wongsam (2007)
suggest exploiting the Campbell (1991) decomposition of returns into shocks
to expected cashflows and shocks to expected returns, the idea being that
only common correlation in the latter (market pricing) is relevant to capital
market integration. Moreover, further decomposing expected return shocks
into global, industry and country components allows identification of the cor-
relations that are consistent with integration. For example, if within-country
inter-industry co-movements in expected returns are an important compo-
nent of the total co-movement, then this suggests that discount rates are
largely driven by country factors and hence markets are largely segmented.
On the other hand, if cross-country same-industry co-movements are impor-
tant, this indicates a common risk exposure and hence a relatively high level
of integration. Based on an analysis of eight large developed countries, Am-
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mer and Wongsam conclude that global and industry factors are the primary
drivers of expected returns, consistent with a high level of integration in
these markets. Unfortunately, New Zealand is not among the countries they
analyse.
2.4 Common discount factors
Another method for inferring and measuring integration, suggested by Flood
and Rose (2005), involves looking for convergence in discount factors. Under-
standing this approach requires a little basic theory. In general (see Cochrane,
2001, pp.6–9), the time t price Pjit of asset j in country i is given by:
Pji,t = Et[di,t+1xj,t+1].
where xj,t+1 is the state-contingent payoff on asset j at time t+1 and di,t+1 is
the stochastic discount factor (SDF) for country i. In words, x is the number
of dollars generated by the asset in a particular future state and d is the
present value of a dollar in that state; their product is then the present value
of income generated by the asset in that state and so the price of the asset
equals the expected product across all states. The insight of Flood and Rose
is that all assets share the same SDF in markets that are integrated, i.e., there
is no market-specific discount rate. That is, in an integrated market:
Pji,t = Et[dt+1xj,t+1]
where dt+1 is the common SDF. Flood and Rose show that this equation can
be rewritten as:
xj,t+1 = δt[pj,t − covt(dj,t+1, xj,t+1)] + j,t+1 (1)
where δt ≡ 1/Et[dt+1] and j,t+1 is a zero-mean prediction error term. Equa-
tion (1) can be used to estimate δ in different countries; under the null
hypothesis of integration, these estimates are equal. Claus and Lucey (2008)
apply this method to 2006 data from 10 countries in the Asia-Pacific region
(including New Zealand) and then calculate standardised mean absolute dif-
ferences (SMAD) as follows:
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Table 8: Estimated discount rate convergence
Standardised mean absolute differences (SMAD) of estimated discount rates
between (i) New Zealand and Australia and (ii) a selection of other countries
from the Asia-Pacific region. Sourced from Claus and Lucey (2008).
New Zealand Australia
Australia 0.098 0.000
Hong Kong 0.032 0.100
India 0.075 0.128
Japan 0.037 0.072
Korea 0.034 0.132
Malaysia 0.111 0.028
New Zealand 0.000 0.098
Singapore 0.158 0.068
Taiwan 0.137 0.235
Thailand 0.020 0.116
Sum 0.703 0.976
SMADij = E
S[|δs − δk|]/(δs + δk).
where ES[.] denotes the sample mean and s and k are country indexes. At
each date, SMAD equals the absolute value of the difference between the
deltas of two countries and expresses this as a proportion of the sum of the
deltas; if the two markets are integrated, this number should be close to zero.
Claus and Lucey (2008) report that New Zealand has the smallest sum-
of-SMADs among their 10 countries and hence conclude that it has the most
integrated stock market in the Asia-Pacific region. A summary of their results
appears in Table 8. Note that the sum of SMADs for New Zealand is only
72% of that of Australia (0.703 versus 0.976), suggesting that New Zealand is
considerably more integrated with the Asia-Pacific region than is Australia
— consistent with the correlations evidence in Table 7. On an individual
country basis, New Zealand is estimated to be less integrated than Australia
with Singapore and Malaysia, but more so with the other six markets. One
surprising aspect of these calculations is the implied relatively low level of
integration between Australia and New Zealand – their SMAD of 0.098 is only
the 6th lowest (out of 9) for New Zealand and 4th lowest for Australia.12
12However, only Japan has a lower SMAD with both countries than they do with each
other. This reinforces the point that New Zealand and Australian capital markets tend to
be most highly integrated with different sets of countries.
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2.5 Valuation ratios
All of the above methods for measuring integration require statistical esti-
mation. However, Bekaert et al. (2008) point out that a characteristic of an
integrated market is a convergence of valuation ratios – which are observ-
able at each point in time and hence do not need to be estimated. More
precisely, they show that full integration implies that industry earnings-yield
differentials should be small and explained fully by differences in leverage
and earnings volatility. As a result, they propose that a country’s effective
segmentation can be measured by a weighted sum of industry earnings-yield
absolute differentials:
SEGit =
∑
j
αji,t|EPji,t − EPjw,t|.
where αji,t is the weight of industry j in country i at time t, EPji,t is industry
j′s earnings yield in country i, and EPjw,t is the the world earnings yield for
industry j. In an integrated market, SEG should be close to zero, similar to
the factor price equalisation result from classic trade theory.
Bekaert et al. (2008) calculate SEG for a sample of 50 countries between
1980 and 2005. Table 9 summarises these results for the most recent 5-year
period, and also reports the average annual change in SEG over the entire
26-year period. According to this measure, New Zealand is one of the most
segmented developed countries, is twice as segmented as Australia, and is
on a par with Malaysia, Indonesia and the Phillippines. The second column
reveals the source of this assessment: the average change in SEG for New
Zealand over the full sample period has been less than 1/5 that of Australia,
with similar or greater shortfalls relative to Canada, Finland, France, Ireland,
Singapore and the United Kingdom. In short, the integration of New Zealand
into world capital markets has, according to this measure, stalled over the last
two decades. What would be interesting to know – but which is unreported
by Bekaert et al. – is whether or not this phenomenon is evenly spread over
the entire 1980-2005 period, or is concentrated in, for example, a more recent
sub-period.
Another valuation ratio that may shed some light on capital market
integration is Tobin’s Q – the ratio of market value to replacement cost. As
Hietala (1989) and others show, stocks that are only able to be held by do-
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Table 9: Earnings-yield segmentation measure (SEG) for selected countries
Estimates of segmentation for selected countries. Based on SEG measure of
Bekaert et al. (2008).
Average Segmentation Average Annual Change
2001-2005 in Segmentation
1980-2005
Australia 1.2% −2.74%
Canada 1.7% −2.18%
Finland 2.2% −4.60%
France 2.0% −2.08%
Indonesia 2.7% −0.81%
Ireland 1.7% −2.71%
Korea 3.6% −0.65%
Malaysia 2.4% −0.24%
New Zealand 2.5% −0.47%
Phillippines 2.5% −1.73%
Singapore 2.3% −2.87%
Thailand 3.8% 2.35%
United Kingdom 1.2% −2.91%
United States 0.8% 0.94%
mestic citizens typically trade at a lower price (and hence Q) than stocks
open to all investors. Since these two situations correspond to segmenta-
tion and integration respectively, country Q values that markedly differ from
those prevailing in similar countries may indicate the presence of significant
segmentation.
Some information on country Q values appears in the first two columns
of Table 10. New Zealand Q values are slightly below those of Australia,
but essentially comparable. Most other countries also report Qs in the same
general area; only Korea has a significantly lower value, suggesting that its
capital markets may be more segmented than most – consistent with the
evidence contained in earlier tables.
One problem with attempting to infer capital market integration from
absolute Q values is that several other factors are also likely to influence
Q, e.g., future investment opportunities, which affect Q, are likely to differ
across countries at any particular point in time. A potentially more fruit-
ful approach involves comparing the Q of a country’s international firms –
those that list on major exchanges such as the LSE, NYSE or NASDAQ, or
have otherwise raised equity capital in international markets – with that of
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Table 10: Tobin’s Q in selected countries
Estimates of Tobin’s Q – the ratio of equity market value to replacement
cost – based on (i) those reported in Table 1 of Gozzi et al. (2008) and (ii)
the reciprocal of the Book-to-Market ratios reported in Table 1 of Bekaert
et al. (2008). Lower Q may be associated with greater segmentation, as is
a greater difference between the Q values of a country’s international firms
and its domestic firms. International firms are those that list on the LSE,
NYSE or NASDAQ or have otherwise raised equity capital in international
markets.
Total Q Total Q Intl Q/Dom Q
Bekaert et al. Gozzi et al. Gozzi et al.
1980-2005 1989-2000 1989-2000
Australia 1.15 1.51 1.04
Canada 1.11 1.57 1.36
Finland 1.04 1.30 0.91
France 0.95 1.39 1.18
Germany 1.25 1.55 1.03
Indonesia NA 1.34 1.08
Ireland 0.83 1.55 1.08
Japan 1.41 1.34 1.06
Korea NA 1.04 1.07
Malaysia NA 1.70 1.09
New Zealand 1.10 1.46 1.26
Phillippines NA 1.40 1.10
Singapore 1.10 1.45 1.26
Taiwan NA 1.65 1.29
Thailand NA 1.28 1.51
United Kingdom 1.14 NA NA
United States 1.23 NA NA
its purely domestic firms. The idea here is that international firms are by
definition integrated into world capital markets, so a significant difference
between their Q values and those of their domestic counterparts would sug-
gest that the domestic capital markets are segmented. By contrast, similar
Qs would indicate that the same SDF is being used to price both groups,
and hence integration.
The ratio of international firm Qs to those of their domestic counter-
parts is reported in the third column of Table 10. The New Zealand ratio
of 1.26 is considerably higher than both Australia’s 1.04 and the sample av-
erage of 1.15. This may indicate that the pricing process being applied to
stocks listed solely on New Zealand capital markets differs from that applied
to international firms, consistent with local capital markets being at least
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somewhat segmented from foreign markets. Of course, the definition of an
international firm here is one that participates in United States or European
capital markets, so this result may only confirm above findings that New
Zealand appears to be more integrated with Asia-Pacific markets than with
developed western markets. It would be interesting to see if similar results
continue to hold when the definition of an international firm is broadened to
include, for example, New Zealand firms listed in Australia.
2.6 Participation in foreign markets
All the methods for measuring integration that have been employed thus far
focus on price behaviour. Pungulescu (2008) argues that a useful comple-
mentary approach is to look at participation, i.e., quantity behaviour. The
idea here is that investor under-weighting – relative to the theoretical bench-
mark of fully integrated markets – of foreign assets is indicative of market
segmentation.13
The extent of foreign stock under-weighting by residents of country i
is defined as the actual country i investment in these stocks relative to the
optimal level of investment specified by standard portfolio choice models:
UWit =
actualit
optimalit
.
where optimalit is calculated as the proportion of foreign stocks in the world
market portfolio. So for example, a country that makes up 10% of the world
market portfolio should hold 90% of its equity investments in foreign securi-
ties and UW = 0.2 would indicate that it actually only holds 18%, i.e., 1/5
of the optimum quantity, or 80% underweight.
Table 11 reports UW for both investor countries and destination coun-
tries. The first of these calculates UW from the perspective of local investor
holdings of foreign equities, i.e., the Australian value of 0.24 indicates that
Australians underweight foreign equities in their investment portfolios by
(1 − 0.24) = 76% on average. The second reports UW from the perspec-
tive of foreign investor holdings of local equities, i.e., the Australian value
of 0.22 indicates that non-Australian investors underweight Australian eq-
uities in their investment portfolios by (1 − 0.22) = 78% on average. The
13The so-called ‘home bias’ has long been noted in the international finance literature.
For an in-depth discussion and analysis, see Frogley (2005).
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Table 11: Equity home bias: investor and destination countries
For each country in the table, the first column shows local investor holdings
of foreign equities relative to the theoretical optimum (the weight of foreign
equities in the world market portfolio) as of 2000; numbers greater (less)
than 1.0 denote over-(under-)weighting by local investors in foreign equities.
The second column shows foreign investor holdings of local equities relative
to the theoretical optimum (the weight of local equities in the world market
portfolio) as of 1997; numbers greater (less) than 1.0 denote over-(under-
)weighting by foreigners in local equities.
Investor country bias Destination country bias
Bertaut and Kole (2004) Faruquee et al. (2004)
Australia 0.24 0.22
Canada 0.26 0.30
Finland 0.25 0.12
France 0.24 0.20
Germany 0.26 NA
Ireland NA 0.86
Japan 0.11 0.13
Korea 0.01 NA
Malaysia 0.01 0.03
New Zealand 0.36 0.31
Singapore 0.27 0.28
results reveal substantial home bias: all countries in the table significantly
underweight foreign equities in their investment portfolios, while all countries
except Ireland are significantly underweighted as an investment destination.
This suggests at least some degree of market segmentation, since all ratios
should be equal to 1.0 in a perfectly integrated market.14 Overall, New
Zealand scores relatively well, having the least amount of under-weighting
as an investor country and the second-least as a destination country; under-
participation levels are approximately 10-15% lower than those of Australia.
Although not shown in the table, the Australian market is highly attractive to
New Zealand investors: New Zealand’s UW score for investment in Australia
is a massive 4.2. However, a cautionary note is in order here: both investor
and destination country calculations are based on relatively old data (2000
and 1997 respectively) that may not be representative of the more recent
past.
What about participation in non-equity markets? Here, much less is
14Of course, this assumes that the optimal benchmark is correctly specified. How-
ever, the deviation from this benchmark is so systematic and so pronounced that mis-
specification is unlikely to be a large part of the puzzle.
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Table 12: Lender home bias: participation by Australian banks in syndicated
loans to Asia-Pacific countries
Various measures of Australian bank participation in 4661 syndicated loans
to borrowing firms from 12 Asia-Pacific countries during 1999–2006, based
on the data in Table 2 of Boyle and Stover (2008). The first numerical
column gives the number of loans (by country) in which Australian banks
participate. Proportion of loans expresses this number as a proportion of the
total number of loans made to that country in the Boyle and Stover sample.
Total contribution is the total investment ($mill) in these loans. Contribution
per loan equals Total contribution divided by Number of loans. Loan share
equals Total contribution divided by the total value of country-loans. Banks
per loan is the average number of participating Australian banks in each
loan. Source: Boyle and Stover (2008).
Borrower Number Proportion Total Contribution Loan Banks
Country of loans of loans contribution per loan share per loan
($mill) ($mill)
Australia 416 0.95 45024.69 108.23 0.49 2.06
New Zealand 103 0.96 11944.52 115.97 0.59 2.16
Hong Kong 44 0.12 1129.23 25.66 0.05 0.13
India 13 0.15 172.82 13.29 0.11 0.14
Indonesia 2 0.07 22.65 11.33 0.17 0.07
Japan 14 0.01 1093.05 78.07 0.16 0.01
South Korea 19 0.05 433.86 22.83 0.11 0.05
Malaysia 15 0.14 401.47 26.76 0.08 0.15
Philippines 9 0.13 124.27 13.81 0.05 0.14
Singapore 17 0.12 830.55 48.86 0.17 0.14
Taiwan 5 0.01 154.82 30.96 0.17 0.01
Thailand 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Asia Region 13.60 0.034 435.13 31.99 0.088 0.084
currently known, but a recent paper by Boyle and Stover (2008) examines
the lending decisions of Australian banks (as measured by their participation
in syndicated loans) with respect to borrowers from 12 countries in the Asia-
Pacific region between 1999 and 2006. A summary of their findings appears
in Table 12 which, overall, indicates considerable regional segmentation. For
one class of borrowers – firms from Australia and New Zealand – Australian
banks as a group are active loan syndicate participants, providing an average
contribution of over $110 million to 95% of such loans. For another class of
borrowers – firms from the wider Asian region – participation is much thinner:
an average contribution of $32 million to less than 4% of loans.15 However,
15Boyle and Stover (2008) show that much of this apparent bias can be ‘explained’ by
various important differences with Australia and New Zealand - geographical, cultural,
legal and banking.
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Table 13: Ratio of international to domestic firms by country
For each country in the table, the column numbers represent the ratio of
(i) international firms to (ii) domestic firms in the samples of the respective
authors. Both samples cover the period 1989–2000. International firms are
those that list on the LSE, NYSE or NASDAQ or have otherwise raised
equity capital in international markets.
Gozzi et al. (2008) Claessens and Schmukler (2007)
Sample size = 9096 Sample size = 39517
Australia 0.36 0.12
Canada 0.32 0.15
Finland 0.25 0.18
France 0.10 0.08
Germany 0.07 0.07
Indonesia 0.09 0.05
Ireland 1.15 0.75
Japan 0.05 0.07
Korea 0.08 0.03
Malaysia 0.04 0.02
New Zealand 0.20 0.12
Phillippines 0.20 0.08
Singapore 0.08 0.08
Taiwan 0.19 0.09
Thailand 0.07 0.05
Total 0.15 0.07
New Zealand firms would seem to be well integrated into the Australian bank
lending market. Indeed, Australian participation in loans to New Zealand
borrowers is, if anything, on a slightly greater scale than their involvement
with Australian borrowers.
A final participation measure is the extent to which a country’s firms
actively engage with foreign capital markets, i.e., are ‘internationalised’. As
discussed above, an international firm is defined to be one that has listed
on a major exchange such as the LSE, NYSE or NASDAQ, or has otherwise
raised equity capital in international markets (without listing). Countries
with high proportions of such firms would seem, prima facie, to be more
integrated with world capital markets. Table 13 uses data from two studies
by Gozzi et al. (2008) and Claessens and Schmukler (2007) to calculate the
ratio of international to domestic firms across a range of countries. Perhaps
surprisingly, New Zealand scores fairly highly according to this measure,
ranking in the top 1/3 of countries in both samples. Compared to Australia,
New Zealand’s proportion of international firms is about half in the Gozzi
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Table 14: New Zealand and Australia ‘rankings’ in the various integration
measures
Summary of the New Zealand and Australia integration rankings in Tables
6–13. ‘x/y’ denotes a ranking of ‘x’ in a sample of ’y’ countries. In the final
column, terms in parentheses refer to the source column of the corresponding
table.
New Zealand Australia Data coverage Table
Return correlations
Short-term 10/17 5/17 Global; 1990–2007 Table 6(1)
Long-term 5/17 7/17 Global; 1800–2000 Table 6(2)
Valuation measures
Earnings yield 9/15 2/15 Global: 1980–2005 Table 9(1)
Earnings yield change 9/15 2/15 Global: 1980–2005 Table 9(2)
Market-Book 7/12 4/12 Global: 1980–2005 Table 10(1)
Tobin’s Q 7/15 6/15 Global: 1989–2000 Table 10(2)
Intl–Domestic Q 11/15 2/15 Global: 1989–2000 Table 10(2)
Discount rate 1/10 6/10 Asia-Pacific: 2006 Table 8
Equity home bias
Investor country 1/12 8/12 Global; 2000 Table 11(1)
Destination country 4/11 8/11 Global; 1997 Table 11(2)
International firms
Small sample 5/15 2/15 Global: 1989–2000 Table 13(1)
Large sample 4/15 4/15 Global: 1989–2000 Table 13(2)
et al. sample, but identical in the much larger sample of Claessens and
Schmukler.
To conclude this section, a synthesis of New Zealand ‘rankings’ accord-
ing to these various measures of integration is given by Table 14. The overall
picture is one of a country that ‘participates’ extensively in international
capital markets, attracts considerable investment from foreign investors, but
whose domestic pricing and valuation processes differ somewhat from those
operating in global markets. Interestingly however, the latter phenomenon
seems to disappear when the foreign markets considered are restricted to be
from the Asia-Pacific region.
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3 Final comments
The relatively fragmented nature of the above evidence means that it is
difficult to make definitive or precise statements about the extent of New
Zealand’s integration with world capital markets. Nevertheless, with some
trepidation, three tentative conclusions may be in order.
1. The degree of integration between the New Zealand and Australian
markets appears to be high. Equity returns are strongly correlated,
each country participates heavily in the equity market of the other, and
Australian-owned banks not only have a dominating presence in New
Zealand, but also treat New Zealand borrowers as ‘one of their own’
when it comes to large lending positions. Although some barriers may
remain – such as the non-recognition of New Zealand tax imputation
credits – resolution of these seems more likely to determine the choice
of firm location (both physically and in terms of exchange listing) than
contribute materially to trans-Tasman integration per se.
2. Beyond Australia, New Zealand may be more integrated with countries
in the Asia-Pacific region than it is with the older and more developed
markets of Western Europe and North America. By contrast, there is
some evidence to suggest the reverse is the case for Australia.
3. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that New Zealand capital
markets suffer from a significant segmentation problem. Its rankings
across the various integration measures are generally in the top 2/3 of
the countries reported.
However, one would be unwise to push any of this too far. Most of the
studies cited and utilised in this paper either use relatively old data, or are
in working paper (i.e., preliminary) form, and/or are unable to shed detailed
light on New Zealand’s situation. Clearly, there is a need for additional work
using the most recent data available that focuses specifically on New Zealand.
Such work might include:
• An application of the Costello et al. (2008) exercise to New Zealand,
both with respect to the rest of the world and to individual countries,
to determine the extent of any remaining diversification benefits that
New Zealand is able to offer foreign investors.
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• An update of the Chay et al. (2001)-type analysis to determine the
relative importance of global versus industry versus country factors in
the pricing of New Zealand securities.
• An extension of the International–Domestic firm Q ratio analysis to one
that defines ‘International’ as including Australian-listed New Zealand
firms (see p21).
• An updating of the various valuation ratio and equity participation
analyses to more recent data.
• An extension of the Kim and Sheen (2007) study to risk-sharing ar-
rangements with countries other than Australia and, possibly, to other
welfare measures.
What if such additional analysis indicated that New Zealand could
achieve, and benefit from, additional integration with world capital markets?
What might facilitate such development? Most studies of the determinants
and effects of integration stress factors that are largely beyond New Zealand’s
control (e.g., size and distance from other markets), or on which New Zealand
already scores highly (e.g., creditor and shareholder rights, efficiency of le-
gal system). However, some hint might be given by Schularick and Steger’s
(2006) demonstration of the importance of property rights for attaining the
full benefits of integration. New Zealand government knee-capping of Tele-
com shareholders and interference in the affairs of Auckland Airport share-
holders, and NZX’s short-lived intention to disenfranchise majority-block
shareholders on matters relating to independent director appointments are
recent examples of scant regard being paid to investor property rights, with
potentially damaging implications for New Zealand capital markets. While
foreign investors are generally prepared, in a rule-of-law country like New
Zealand, to take a chance on capricious users of capital, they are likely to be
far less inclined to risk exposure to the whims of governments and regulators.
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